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Abstract 
 
 
Textile manufacturing in eight developing countries: how far does the business 
environment explain firms’ productive inefficiency? 
 
 
Production frontiers and inefficiency determinants are estimated by using stochastic models.  
Textile manufacturing is considered for a sample of eight developing countries encompassing 
about one thousand firms. We find that the most influential individual inefficiency 
determinants relate to in-house organization. Both access to financing and infrastructural 
services (e.g. power supply, modern information technologies…) also matter. Information 
about determinants is then regrouped into three broad categories (e.g. managerial 
organization, economic environment, institutions) by using principal component analyses. 
Results do not reject the hypothesis that managerial know-how and the quality of institutions 
are the most important determinants. The impact of the external economic environment is of 
less importance although statistically significant. Sector-based simulations are then proposed 
in order to assess productivity gains which would occur if firms had the opportunity to evolve 
in most favorable environments within the sample. Domestic and international production 
contexts are considered, respectively. When referring to domestic benchmarks, the 
contribution of in-house organization prevails as the main source of gains for the eight 
countries. The role of institutions proves dominant for Egypt and India when focusing on 
international simulations. 
 
Key words: Textile; firms; technical efficiency; organizational know-how; productivity; 
institutions; external economic environment; one step stochastic frontier method  
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I. Introduction   
 
Competitiveness can be a “dangerous obsession” to say it in Krugman’s (1994) words, but it 
is a paramount constraint for firm survival and the long run domestic development. Beyond 
the impact of macroeconomic policy, particularly the exchange rate instrument that helps to 
attain this objective through relative prices, competitiveness mainly depends on the 
productive performance (Dollar and Wolff 1993). Firm productivity, which is influenced by 
producers’ behavior and the external environment, is therefore the best overall measure of the 
long run competitiveness. Based on a standardized questionnaire covering a wide range of 
countries, World Bank surveys about the Investment Climate Assessment (ICA) have 
encouraged the emergence of an empirical literature on firm productivity levels at the 
international level. Recent papers by Dollar et al (2005, 2006) but also by Eifert et al (2007) 
fall into this category. 
The present study relies on the empirical exploration of firms’ data for textile 
manufacturing in eight developing countries in the early  two thousands: Brazil (2003), 
Ecuador (2003), Egypt (2004), India (2000), Morocco (2004), Pakistan (2002), South Africa 
(2003), Sri-Lanka (2004). Microeconomic statistical information has been pooled to constitute 
an international panel. We make use of the technical inefficiency concept and appraise the 
respective importance of economic, institutional and in-house organizational determinants on 
firms’ productivity levels. Four reasons underlie the interest for textile manufacturing. (i) First 
of all, it is one of the most important manufacturing sectors in the developing countries 
studied. For example, production and transformation of fibers account for more than one third 
of the added value or formal employment in Morocco and Egypt, encompassing several 
hundreds of firms. (ii) Secondly, textile manufacturing is strongly exposed to the implications 
of the process of globalization. Competition increased with the end of the Multifibre 
Agreement which restricted exports from China and India over thirty years (1974-2005). New 
competitive pressures resulted from this evolution with world prices tending to fall in terms of 
US dollars. To face this price erosion, firms’ productivity has to increase to preserve 
profitability. (iii) Thirdly, the heterogeneity of products is also rather less than in other 
sectors, although in some middle income economies product differentiation forms a  strategy 
of upgrading to respond to competition from low labor cost emerging countries. (iv) Lastly, 
and related to the previous argument, technology differs somewhat across firms and countries, 
but heterogeneity is rather less than in more sophisticated sectors.  
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This paper focuses on the measurement and explanation of technical inefficiencies or 
relative firms’ productivity levels. World Bank Investment Climate (ICA) surveys possess 
valuable characteristics including the use of a standard questionnaire providing homogeneous 
data on firms’ production, investment and employment decisions. ICA surveys also cover 
various factors dependent upon public regulation, governance, and access to finance or 
infrastructural services. First of all, the “one-step” formulation of stochastic production 
frontiers (SFA) is adopted by considering three categories of inefficiency determinants (e.g. 
economic, institutional and in-house organizational factors). In-house organizational factors 
are found to be important. Entrepreneurship matters more than external economic factors 
which are captured by a limited number of variables reflecting access to financing, the quality 
of public services or the size of the city where firms are located. The role of institutions is 
more ambiguous. On the one hand, they have a limited effect over firms or domestic 
geography but, on the other hand, they have a strong impact on the determination of 
productivity differences between countries, especially when Doing Business information 
complements ICA data. Secondly, stochastic frontier models and inefficiency determinants 
are used to predict potential productivity gains if firms operate in a homogeneous context. 
These predictions are based on the adjusted efficiency measures as proposed by Coelli et al 
(1999). These adjustments are made in respect of the most favorable production context. 
Domestic and international scenarios are then successively considered. The impact of 
organizational factors is strongly prevalent in the nationwide scenario. Institutional factors 
prove to be dominant for Egypt and India when the international framework is considered. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the sector-based data 
surveys for the eight above mentioned countries. We draw attention to the main 
characteristics of firms’ production but also to their productive environment. Section 3 briefly 
describes the stochastic frontier methodology and the adjusted efficiency measures. Section 4 
is devoted to the empirical results. Section 5 concludes by summing up the main results. 
 
II. The sector-based ICA data 
At firms’ level, productivity depends on a wide range of factors. For convenience, the 
information from World Bank ICA surveys can be regrouped into three categories, hereafter 
called g- categories.   
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The external economic environment.  
The quality of roads, transport, telecommunication and power provision varies considerably 
including within the boundaries of a country. Many authors have referred to the loss of 
economic efficiency due to the failure in the provision of public utilities. The ICA 
questionnaire tries to appraise what these constraints mean through qualitative questions 
about the severity of the problems they have to manage. Unreliable public supply leads to 
excessive costs. Firms with easy access to electricity supply, modern telecommunication 
services and efficient transport tend to invest more intensively and prove more productive. 
Competition is also an important channel and increases with the degree of openness. Although 
the causality is subject to debate, the dominant idea is that the higher the export ratio of sales, 
the higher the productive performance. By producing for external markets, competition 
provides a permanent challenge. The situation is quite different when production is assigned 
to domestic customers, and firms benefit from import restrictions. ICA surveys incorporate 
several items addressing these points.  
The degree of openness being given, the size of the city as measured by the number of 
inhabitants where the firm is located is also an influential element reflecting the acuteness of 
the local competition. The ICA questionnaire is coded in such a way to distinguish 5 types of 
towns, from the capital city to the smallest agglomeration of less than 50,000 inhabitants. 
Larger markets attract more firms, which makes competition tougher. This variable 
potentially interacts with the quality of infrastructures. In remote areas with a low density of 
population, bottlenecks in the delivery of infrastructural services can be a natural protection. 
It may benefit to producers against the surplus of consumers enhancing excess profits or a 
waste of resources. A “quiet life” and managerial inefficiency are likely as well as a non-
optimal scale of production when firms evolve in areas with a small population. 
Agglomeration economies are thought to arise from a variety of mechanisms. Indeed, on the 
demand side, large agglomerations mean that consumers have the possibility of comparing 
products with a price-quality criterion; on the supply side, concentration means the possibility 
for similar firms to share the same suppliers, the existence of thick labour markets ironing out 
firm-level shocks or facilitating matching, or the possibility to learn from the experience and 
innovation of others (Duranton and Puga, 2004). As shown by Fujita et al (1999), the 
grouping of firms, which goes hand in hand with large cities, enhances external economies of 
scale and stimulates dynamic competitiveness. To survive in the Schumpeterian “creative 
destruction” environment, organizations are more likely to adopt the most efficient productive 
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conventions they encounter. A higher average productivity of firms and workers in large cities 
can result from a stronger Darwinian selection of firms. 
Access to financing potentially plays an important role on the productivity level. 
Manufacturing activities are spread out over time. The adoption of the efficient technology 
requires investment today with the payoffs coming later; even ongoing productive activity 
requires inputs in advance with revenues realized at a later point in time. Inadequacies in 
finance create barriers and impede new entry into markets. These inadequacies limit the 
competitive discipline facing incumbent firms, dulling their incentives to innovate and 
improve their productivity. Developed financial markets reduce firms’ reliance on their own 
cash flows and money from families and friends. As a result, they lead to faster growth in 
productivity (see World Bank, 2005; Levine, Loayza, and Beck, 2000). Two variables have 
been considered in this paper to appraise the role of financial services. As regard the overdraft 
facility, as supplier credits, it is linked to the working capital and the possibility for firms to 
manage liquidity constraints, to face the instabilities of the environment. The access to 
financing for longer periods has a more permanent impact. It reflects the ability for firms to 
snap up opportunities to invest, to incur large sunk costs to enter into export markets. 
 
The institutional environment. 
 Institutions define the rules of the economic game. They shape activity and have a strong 
bearing on the organization of production as well as investment decisions. Governments play 
a key role in providing public facilities and formal rules, such as laws delineating property 
rights or the judicial institutions liable to enforce these rights in a transparent way. Conflicting 
with this normative representation of the State, political economy suggests that politicians and 
public bureaus can increase transaction costs. Potential arbitrariness takes many forms. The 
standard ICA questionnaire stresses this dimension through a wide range of items such as 
State intervention and red tape of public administration, corruption, cronyism and more 
generally, the inability to uphold public order. Through the ICA questionnaire, entrepreneurs 
are asked to give their opinion on the business-government relations in several fields affecting 
production activities. They have to assess the labor regulations and external trade facilities 
through the number of days they need to import or export. Firms are also asked to state how 
confident they are in the capacity of the judicial system to resolve conflict and enforce 
contractual and property rights in business disputes. A major problem with ICA surveys is 
that many firms do not respond to some questions. Average regional perceptions that can be 
CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2009.23 
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considered by firms’ size category can be used as relevant determinants under the assumption 
that this problem is the same for all firms.  
The ICA database can also be extended with the country-based information of the World 
Bank’s Doing Business report. Institutions are then considered homogeneous across a country 
whatever the sector of activity and wherever the firm is located. This option can be restrictive. 
In the 2005 issue, the World Development Report showed that a national law can be applied 
differently within a country. The time taken to transfer property title in Brazil varies between 
15 days in Brasilia and 65 days in Salvador. Even within a single location, the same 
conditions can affect firms differently according to their activities. The combination of ICA 
surveys and Doing Business might be seen as a pragmatic solution to overcome statistical 
problems. Doing Business collects information on the number of calendar days, the number of 
procedures and the cost required to complete various types of business transactions. These 
procedures may be in relation to starting or closing a business, dealing with licenses and 
registering property, trading across borders, making contracts or firing workers. All these 
elements complement firms’ perceptions and potentially reduce the subjectivity underlying 
their answers. 
 
 Managerial know-how and in-house organization.  
There is no clear-cut conclusion about the relationship between productive efficiency and firm 
size. Large formal companies have potential advantages. They are intrinsically capable of 
coping with informational imperfections. However some authors consider that small 
organizations are more appropriate to manage severe market and government failures. In this 
paper, firm size has been considered through the number of permanent workers and 
alternatively through three conventional categories stratifying firms according to their 
employment level (less than 20, from 20 to 99, 100 and more). Organizational or managerial 
efficiency also depends on the quality of human resources including sector or experience 
within the firm of the top manager. The human capital quality of the firm as measured by the 
percentage of the workforce having a high-level of education also matters. Several variables 
can be used to capture this effect according to the number of school-years from the 
elementary to the university levels. The same conclusion applies to the percentage of the total 
permanent employees who benefit from in-house formal training. The production 
performance is also determined by the mobilization of new information technologies. In some 
large economies, such as China and India, the World Bank’s Investment Climate surveys 
found that garment manufacturers are more productive when telecommunication services are 
CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2009.23 
 8 
better. The availability of these services relates to the exogenous economic environment. But 
a regular use of a Website is more focused on the demand side, revealing firms’ ability to 
achieve quick and cheap interaction with customers and suppliers.  Foreign companies can be 
seen as an additional source of know-how connected with good practice in management. They 
generally reduce the fixed costs of producing technological innovations and the marginal cost 
of their replication in the domestic environment. Moreover, foreign firms or their participation 
in domestic firms’ capital can be instrumental in having access to external markets more 
easily.  
A selection of the main Investment Climate variables is presented in Table 1. We regroup 
them into the three above-mentioned g-categories; the number of firms being given in 
parentheses under the variable. On average, the number of South African firms is narrow, no 
more than 16, and they are both large and open, as shown by the export sales ratio or the 
participation of foreigners in the ownership. The opposite situation is observed in Pakistan, 
where firms mainly produce to satisfy domestic demand and do not solicit foreign financial 
participation. The role of new information technologies which we appraise by the percentage 
of computer users and access to the Internet is not necessarily correlated with size, but seems 
to be higher in countries with the highest per capita income GDP. The difference between 
Ecuador, 2180 dollars in 2004, and India (620$) clearly illustrates this point.  
Except in South Africa and Morocco, some constraints on public services are strong. This 
is the case for power supply. It is especially damageable for small firms’ productivity level as 
the size of generators tends to be larger than the capacity required by their potential 
production. Electricity problems prove of importance in Pakistan and Sri-Lanka. It is also 
significant for an upper-middle income country such as Brazil. As regards financing, the 
constraint is abnormally high. It conflicts sometimes with information about overdraft 
facilities although the liquidity constraints are quite different from the time frame underlying 
the financing of investments. In Morocco, although 67% of the 148 respondent firms benefit 
from overdraft facilities, more than 75% of producers complain about structural problems 
concerning access to commercial bank financing. A similar comment applies to Ecuador and, 
surprisingly, to Brazil.  
Information about the quality of the institutional environment is quite poor. Corruption 
seems to be significant for 67% of entrepreneurs in Brazil, much more than in Egypt (43.0%). 
It is a also a severe constraint in Pakistan (41.7%) although informal payments are limited to 
about 2% of sales,  much less than in Ecuador where this phenomenon accounts for 8% with 
only 33% of firms complaining about corruption. The absence of any normative reference 
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about what the rules are or should be, as well as the subjectivity underlying firms’ 
perceptions, is likely to be the main difficulty in determining the impact of the institutional 
environment using ICA data.    
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10 
 Table 1 -  Main variables reflecting organizational, economic and institutional environments: country means (number of firms in parentheses) 
Countries Brazil Ecuador Egypt India Sri Lanka Morocco Pakistan South Africa 
                                    Managerial know-how and in-house organization 
Size (number of permanent workers) 181,8 104,7 133,0 224,2 66,0 92,2 87,7 665,9 
 (91) (21) (92) (195) (62) (148) (276) (16) 
Export (% of sales) 8,5 13,7 8,4 9,0 16,0 28,9 6,3 12,1 
 (91) (11) (92) (183) (62) (148) (268) (16) 
Foreign ownership (% of capital) 5,6 5,7 2,0 0,4 11,1 12,0 0,4 17,7 
 (91) (21) (92) (194) (62) (148) (276) (16) 
Education (%,workforce, more 12 years) 8,7 21,2 10,7 17,2 3,2 8,5 4,9 8,8 
 (90) (20) (91) (186) (62) (148) (275) (16) 
Computer users (% of workforce) 19,5 22,4  16,1 8,9 11,0 5,4 20,5 
 (91) (21)  (190) (62) (146) (276) (16) 
Use of website (% of total firms) 76,9 61,9 21,7 25,9 19,4 15,3 6,9 62,5 
 (91) (21) (92) (185) (62) (144) (276) (16) 
                                              External economic environment 
Electricity constraint + 33,0 28,6 28,3 28,7 37,1 8,1 42,4 12,5 
 (91) (21) (91) (195) (62) (148) (276) (16) 
Telecom constraint + 6,6 14,3 4,3 5,1 8,1 2,0 6,5 0,0 
 (91) (21) (92) (195) (62) (148) (276) (16) 
Transport constraint + 16,5 9,5 3,3 11,3 4,8 3,4 11,2 18,8 
 (91) (21) (90) (195) (62) (148) (276) (16) 
Financial constraint + 57,1 42,9 20,7 17,4 9,7 75,7 42,8 6,3 
 (91) (20) (66) (195) (62) (148) (275) (16) 
Overdraft facility (% of total firms) 78,0 76,2 6,5 65,1 64,5 67,6 18,5 100,0 
 (91) (21) (92) (195) (62) (148) (276) (11) 
                                             Institutional environment 
Corruption + 67,0 33,3 43,5 36,9 9,7 15,5 41,7 6,3 
 (91) (21) (89) (194) (62) (148) (276) (16) 
Days for import 12,1 23,1 6,3 7,2 4,3 2,9 14,3 8,6 
 (30) (12) (26) (54) (21) (97) (21) (13) 
Days for export 6,4 12,2 4,5 4,6 2,6 1,7 12,4 4,8 
 (34) (10) (17) (59) (20) (66) (30) (13) 
Informal payments (% of sales)  8,5 5,4  0,1  2,2 0,0 
  (11) (17)  (57)  (276) (16) 
     Source. World Bank, ICA databases.   + Percentage of firms mentioning the constraint as a major obstacle or a very severe constraint. Number of firms given in parentheses. 
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III. SFA and Adjusted efficiencies for environment 
 
The first objective is both to measure and explain firms’ technical inefficiency through three 
g-categories of determinants reflecting organizational, economic and institutional factors. 
Following Coelli et al (1999)’s method, our second objective is to predict firm’s production 
performance when all organizations share the most favorable environment. 
The stochastic frontier model takes the following form: 
     
),(),,( δβ iii ZUVii eDXfY −=       (1) 
Yi is the output for the i-th firm and Xi a vector of inputs. D reflects country dummy variables 
capturing the heterogeneity of the production technology across countries1. Labour (L) and 
capital (K) have been retained as inputs and f (.) is a suitable functional form. The stochastic 
frontier specification decomposes the total error term that we denote ε  into two components: 
the usual random noise V and the asymmetric error term U (Z, ), which depends on the 
inefficiency determinants, the so-called z-factors that affect the inefficiency distribution 
denoted U (see, Battese and Coelli 1995): 
iii ZU ηδ += '        (2) 
),....,,1( 2' piii zzZ =  is the vector of the p-1 variables (zj) associated with the three 
categories of inefficiency determinants. iη  is a half normal variable│N (0, 2Uσ )│ and δ  a 
(1xp) vector of parameters to estimate. These variables are assumed to be not correlated with 
the error components (U, V).  
The model is estimated by the maximum likelihood method. An endogeneity problem 
may arise from some variables, inefficient producers justifying a low technical efficiency by 
the poor quality of power supply or the acuteness of public corruption. To address this issue, a 
first method consists in using regional sector averages of the endogeneous variable (see 
Commander and Svejnar, 2008). The validity of this method depends upon both, the presence 
of poor and good productive performers in each region and a suitable correlation between the 
regional average and the endogeneous variable2. An alternative method is the classical 
instrumental technique. Instruments have to be found, correlated with the specific z-factors 
                                                 
1
 The panel data associate both firms and countries. Country dummies are introduced to determine the 
heterogeneity that is not explained by technical inefficiency factors. 
2
 Regional averages concerning characteristics of the external environment are also useful to complete firms 
missing information on non-behavioral z-factors.  
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but independent from the inefficiency component. Predicted values for the endogenous z-
determinants, denoted zˆ , are introduced in the likelihood function to be maximized. Although 
the estimator is consistent, the bootstrapping procedure has to be used to provide correct 
standard errors. The procedure is as follows:   
Step 1: The frontier is estimated by the maximum likelihood method (MLE) with 
instrumental variables ( zˆ ). Estimates of the two distribution variances are obtained 
( 2ˆ vσ and 2ˆ uσ ). The inefficiency components ( iuˆ ) are estimated according to Jondrow et al 
(1980)’s method. 
Step 2: For each bootstrap iteration b=1,…B, we generate a Gaussian random sample  
)ˆ,0(ˆ 2vbi N σν →  according to its estimated characteristics in step 13. 
Step 3: New bootstrapped samples for the endogenous variable are generated according to the 
equation: i
b
i u
i
b
i eDXfY ˆˆ)ˆ,,( −= νβ , where βˆ  are the estimated parameters of the technology 
obtained  in step 1. 
Step 4: Each bootstrapped sample is estimated by the MLE. The same experience is iterated 
(B=500 times), allowing the calculation of the empirical parameters’ standard errors. 
 Two efficiency measures are derived from the frontier model according to whether they 
are adjusted or not in respect of production in the most favorable environment. Our method of 
adjustment is based on Coelli et al’s (1999) but is different on two points. First of all, the 
reference environment is defined by the 95% quantile when the factor is favorable (e.g., 
access to an overdraft facility) and the 5% quantile in the opposite case (e.g., severe 
infrastructural constraints). The choice of a quantile avoids the sensitivity to outliers. 
Secondly, while Coelli et al. (1999) refer to a linear combination of all factors, our adjusted 
measures are made according to each of the three above- mentioned g-categories of the 
production environment respectively. For example, efficiency predictions with good 
organizational factors are obtained keeping the other two categories unchanged. The 
following formulas then apply: (3), (4), (5). 
),(
),(),(
δ
δβ
a
ii
a
ii
ZU
ZU
i
ia
i e
eXf
Y
TE −
−
==     (3) 
where aiZ  is the adjusted vector of inefficiency determinants. The adjustment of the 
jz variable depends on the sign of the jδ  coefficient. If jδ <0, the jz  variable has a positive 
                                                 
3
 The same method cannot be adopted for the u term as the Jondrow et al estimates do not provide perfect 
predictions of inefficiencies. This method does not provide estimates of ui but the mean of the distribution from 
which ui is generated (see Greene, 2008). 
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impact on efficiency. Then, firms’ performances are adjusted according to the environment 
given by the upper quantile of this variable. In the opposite case ( jδ >0), adjustment is made 
by the lower quantile4: 
0 if  ),min(
0 if  ),max(  
 j
)(
 j
)1(
>=
<= −
δ
δ
α
α
j
j
zji
a
ji
zji
a
ji
qzz
qzz
      (4) 
where )(α
jz
q  is the α -quantile of the variable jz . Coelli et al (1999) report the following 
adjusted inefficiency measure: 
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where (.)Φ denotes the distribution function of the standard Gaussian random variable.  
i
a
i
a
i Z γεδγµ −−= ')1(  ; )/( ),)(1( 222222* vuuvu σσσγσσγγσ +=+−= . aiZ ' is the adjusted vector of 
systematic influences on technical inefficiencies (4). By replacing the adjusted vector aiZ '  by 
the firm observed vector iZ ' in (5), unadjusted inefficiency measures are obtained, the ratio of 
the adjusted to unadjusted measures providing the impact of the environments.  
                         
IV.  Empirical results 
We comment upon the stochastic frontier estimations and then simulate the productivity gains 
that would result from the possibility for firms to evolve in most favorable environments we 
observe in the sample.  
 
 A. Stochastic frontiers with technical inefficiency determinants 
Investment Climate surveys rely on large random samples of firms that reflect the true sector-
based population of each country. Combining firms and countries has some advantages. First 
of all, statistical inference can be carried out on average country distributions of inefficiency, 
reducing the variance of the residual term we would observe in a pure cross-sectional 
analysis. Secondly, through the set of country-dummies, we check the time invariant 
heterogeneity common to all firms. The empirical work relates to eight developing countries 
with a total of 899 firms allowing the estimation of a standard production frontier (e.g. 
without the z-factors). When inefficiency determinants are incorporated, according to the 
specifications of the model, the sample size varies from 840 to 821 firms.  The loss of 
                                                 
4
 For firms evolving in an environment beyond (below) the upper (lower) quantile, adjusted and non-adjusted 
efficiencies measures are the same.  
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observations results from missing variables. This attrition can be a source of a selection bias 
affecting the shape of production technology and/or the z-factors influencing technical 
inefficiency. The potentiality of a bias justifies the use of Heckman’s procedure5, and the 
introduction of the inverse Mills ratio in the models. The sample on which simulations of 
section IV are based includes 821 firms. By country, the number of enterprises is given in 
parentheses: Ecuador (11), South Africa (16), Sri-Lanka (55), Egypt (88), Brazil (90), 
Morocco (144), India (155), and Pakistan (262).    
6
 Table 2 provides the regression results of the “one step” stochastic frontier. The Cobb 
Douglas functional form is assumed to describe the production technology7. To check the 
heterogeneity of technology across countries, fixed effects are present in the specification of 
the production function. Statistically significant these effects are not reported in the table8. 
Fixed effects have not been incorporated among the z-factors as we may expect that they are 
correlated with the county-distributions of efficiencies. The three columns differ by the way 
the inverse Mills ratio is introduced as an extra explanatory variable. The parameter 
associated to this extra regressor being not statistically different from zero there is no 
evidence of selection bias. The sum of input elasticities does not reject constant returns to 
scale. The labor coefficient is about 0.67 and reflects what we generally find in the literature 
for the relative contribution of wages in value- added, between 60 % and 70%. The standard 
error of the inefficiency component ( uσ ) is significant and does not reject the relevance of the 
stochastic frontier model (SFA) against the alternative classical production function 
hypothesis where the error term is a classical random disturbance. The conclusion we draw 
from the breakdown of this error is that about 30% of the total variance of the error can be 
attributed to firms’ technical inefficiency9.  
 For the impact of inefficiency determinants, the potential endogeneity bias has been 
checked by using the instrumental variable technique. Standard errors have been bootstrapped 
according to the semi parametric method we discussed in section III.  Appendix 2 reports the 
                                                 
5
 The estimation results of Heckman’s first step selection provide a high percentage of correct predictions 
(Appendix 1). 
6
  
7
 The mean technical efficiency measures that are reported in Table 4 are obtained under a hypothesis of Cobb-
Douglas technology. The use of a more flexible technology such as the translogarithmic one did not reveal any 
significant variation. The coefficients of the interaction terms proved invariant and those of the primary inputs 
very close to the Cobb-Douglas coefficients. The Spearman Rank correlation between the two efficiency 
distributions is 0.98. 
8
 Although textile products benefit a strong homogeneity than other manufacturing goods, we alternatively tried 
to test heterogeneity according to the main firm product line but with a major inconvenience, the loss of a good 
deal of observations as many enterprises did not provide information about this specific question. 
9
 This percentage is calculated as follows : )/( 222 vuu σσσ +  
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first step results for the three instrumented variables.  In Table 2, we refer to predicted 
variables by (+). Perception depicting the external environment (e.g. electricity supply 
constraint, severity of the corruption phenomenon…) has been replaced by firms’ regional 
capacities according to firms’ size (++) to limit the risk of endogeneity as well as 
measurement errors when firm perceptions are considered. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2009.23 
 16
Table 2 
Stochastic frontiers incorporating individual z-factors 
 
 Value-added 
(Model 1) 
Value-added 
(Model 2) 
Value-added 
(Model 3) 
Production function    
Log (labor) 0.666 0.669 0.669 
 (0.048)*** (0.048)*** (0.047)*** 
Log (capital) 0.321 0.322 0.322 
 (0.022)*** (0.022)*** (0.022)*** 
Inverse Mills ratio  -0.402 -0.324 
  (0.541) (1.060) 
Constant 2.653 2.655 2.647 
 (0.304)*** (0.337)*** (0.400)*** 
Inefficiency determinants    
Size 0.103 0.089 0.116 
 (0.109) (0.110) (0.108) 
Foreign ownership (% of capital) -0.029 -0.027 -0.029 
 (0.054) (0.051) (0.052) 
Export (% of sales) -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Overdraft facility+ -1.002 -1.006 -1.007 
 (0.304)*** (0.308)*** (0.309)*** 
Electricity constraint ++ 0.181 0.189 0.189 
 (0.076)** (0.075)** (0.080)** 
Education  (% workforce, more than 12 years) -0.009 -0.009 -0.010 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) 
Financing constraint + 0.065 0.059 0.061 
 (0.064) (0.067) (0.065) 
Internet services + -0.955 -0.977 -0.996 
 (0.415)** (0.420)** (0.442)** 
Manager’s experience (years, in the sector) -0.021 -0.021 -0.022 
 (0.008)*** (0.008)*** (0.008)*** 
Agglomeration (from large to small cities) 0.133 0.135 0.132 
 (0.070)* (0.067)* (0.069)* 
Corruption ++ -0.077 -0.077 -0.075 
 (0.063) (0.062) (0.063) 
Constant 0.691 0.724 0.715 
 (0.462) (0.478) (0.558) 
Inverse Mills ratio   -0.294 
   (1.310) 
Observations 840 840 840 
uσ  0.56 (0.204) 
0.57 
(0.199) 
0.56 
(0.212) 
vσ  0.86 (0.061) 
0.86 
(0.067) 
0.86 
(0.075) 
Log Likelihood - 1146.7 -1146.7 -1146.2 
 
N.B: Bootstrapped standard errors with 500 replications in parentheses, *significant at 10%; ** 5%; 
*** 1%. Regressions include country dummies in the production function.   
PS:  ++, average regional mean according to firm size; +, predicted variables. Regressions for 
instrumentation of the endogenous variables are provided in Appendix 2. All the constraints have been 
calculated from answers: major obstacle, very severe obstacle. 
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 The possibility for firms to benefit from overdraft facilities proves strongly correlated 
with relative productivity. Loans and overdrafts potentially mean fewer risks of disruption in 
the supply of raw materials and intermediary consumption, better ability to finance working 
capital and new investments. The empirical model also displays the significant impact of 
electricity constraints. The role of this factor has been evidenced in several studies including 
in Dollar et al. (2006). The influence of the agglomeration positively matters at a 90% level of 
confidence. In the enterprise survey, this variable being coded from large to small cities, the 
impact is consistent with hypotheses of agglomeration economies and/or firm selection 
hypotheses. Two in-house-organizational factors provide an statistically significant 
explanation of relative productivities. Top managers’ experience, as measured by the number 
of years at the head of firms, points to a “learning by doing” effect while internet services 
highligh dynamic behavior in stimulating innovation and efficiently managing new 
information technologies. 
Several firms’ characteristics in ICA surveys do not prove relevant, including most 
variables reflecting firms’ or regional perceptions concerning the institutional environment. 
These variables can be correlated with per capita GDP levels and then with country fixed 
effects. Firm size as well as the ownership structure or the export ratios are not correlated 
with firms’ inefficiency. The non-significance remains when instrumentation is used, when 
we leave out the export ratio or foreign participation (see Commander and Svejnar, 2008)10. 
As variables can be inter-correlated, previous results do not necessarily mean the absence of 
any correlation with technical inefficiency. By restricting the specification to a subset of 
indicators the omitted variable bias potentially arises (see Bastos and Nasir, 2004). An 
alternative method is the use of the Principal Component Analysis (PCA). This method has 
the additional and valuable advantage of encapsulating the impact of all inefficiency 
determinants in each of the three indicators based on earlier defined g-categories (e.g., 
external economic environnement, institutional environnement, organizational know-how and 
in-house organization factors). The principal components ( jp ) are orthogonal linear 
combinations of the original variables. A weighted average of these combinations is used to 
                                                 
10
  In this working paper, Commander and Svejnar refer to the 2005 and 2002 Business Environment and 
Enterprise Performance Surveys (BEEPS), collected by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(EBRD) and the World Bank. Firms are from a wide range of sectors in 26 transition countries. 
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construct an aggregate indicator (PCINDg) where gjp is the principal component specific to 
each of the g-categories of variables and gjλ , the j-th eigenvalue of the covariance matrix11.  
                                        ....
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For the institutional environment, ICA surveys suffer from being based on firms’ 
perceptions which may be affected by a subjective assessment of institutions and especially 
the difficulty for entrepreneurs to have a common reference situation of what can be 
considered as a suitable situation. Therefore, the institutional gPCIND  index has been 
calculated by incorporating specific additional country information provided by expert 
assessments obtained from the World Bank’s Doing Business. Figure 1 suggests that some 
variables of Doing Business are highly correlated with average efficiency distributions 
between countries as defined by a standard stochastic frontier without z-determinants12. The 
regression slopes mean that transaction costs potentially handicap production performance at 
all phases of firms’ lifetime (e.g., starting a business, hiring and firing workers, obtaining 
credit, making contracts, winding up a business…)  
For each of the three g-categories of factors, the different principal components that we 
consider for gPCIND  explain at least 70% of the data variation. Appendix 3 reports the PCA 
indicators as well as the variables we used for their construction. In carrying out these PCA,  
previous treatments for variables suspected to be endogeneous have been used.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
11
 The gjλ  are usually presented in descending order. In a first step, and for each g-group of factors, we select the 
Mg number of principal components accounting for at least 70% of the cumulative variance. In a second step, we 
construct a weighted average, with weights being proportional to the contribution of each component to the 
explanation of the total variance. For the calculation of gPCIND , all the variables have been standardized in 
order to present them in the same unit of measurement. 
12
 Figure 1 refers to a larger sample of countries than the eight studied. The initial sample restriction was made 
because of the incompleteness of some country-based data that did not permit an estimation of the frontier with  
z-factors. 
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Figure 1 - Technical efficiency means and a selection of the main Doing Business variables  
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Nota Bene: Each graph plots the indicated governance indicator of the World Bank’s Doing Business 
(horizontal axis) against the country mean efficiency scores (vertical axis).  
The following sample of countries is considered: Algeria, Bangladesh, Brazil, China, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, 
Guatemala, Honduras, India, Lebanon, Morocco, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Philippines, South Africa, Sri-Lanka, 
Thailand and Zambia. 
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Table 3 
Stochastic frontiers with principal components indices : z-determinants regrouped into 
three broad categories of factors. 
 
 Value-added 
(Model 4) 
Value-added 
(Model 5) 
Value-added 
(Model 6) 
Production function    
Log (labor) 0.679 0.670 0.671 
 (0.038)*** (0.033)*** (0.034)*** 
Log (capital) 0.314 0.312 0.312 
 (0.020)*** (0.018)*** (0.018)*** 
Inverse Mills ratio -0.576 -2.221 -1.274 
 (1.558) (2.345) (0.613)** 
Constant 2.616 2.900 2.817 
 (0.316)*** (0.328)*** (0.314)*** 
Inefficiency determinants (PCINDs) 
   
Managerial know-how( in-house 
organization) 
-0.873 -0.616 -0.628 
 (0.341)*** (0.153)*** (0.132)*** 
Economic environment 0.206 0.146 0.148 
 (0.074)*** (0.049)*** (0.047)*** 
Institutional environment  0.549 0.419 
  (0.217)*** (0.164)*** 
Inverse Mills ratio 0.974 -1.422  
 (1.792) (2.503)  
Constant 0.190 1.340 1.024 
 (0.588) (0.607)** (0.426)*** 
Observations 821 821 821 
uσ  0.62 (0.204) 
0.72 
(0.174) 
0.69 
(0.185) 
vσ  0.85 (0.068) 
0.75 
(0.103) 
0.77 
(0.097) 
Log Likelihood -1124.8 -1121.4 -1123.0 
 
Bootstrapped standard errors with 500 replications in parentheses. Coefficients are significant at: *, 
10%; **, 5%; ***, 1%. Regressions incorporate fixed effects at the level of the production 
technology. For the institutional environment, the PCIND results from the combination of the Doing 
Business information and ICA variables reflecting corruption. For more details see: Appendix 3. 
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Table 3 shows the “one step” frontier estimates with the aggregate information (PCINDs). 
Correct MLE standard errors of coefficients have been bootstrapped by using the semi-
parametric procedure (see section III). Country-fixed effects are not reported in this table but 
are introduced in the production technology. The sample selection bias has been tested on 
both the frontier and the z-factors through the inverse Mills ratio. Except for model 6, but 
with a negligible impact on the coefficients of Cobb Douglas technology, this bias is rejected. 
Again, the hypothesis of the frontier proves statistically relevant with an efficiency term ( uσ ) 
accounting for about 30% of the variance of the total error term. In comparison with previous 
regressions where individual z-factors were considered, the coefficient of the production 
technology is marginally modified. Moreover, all PCINDs are significant at the 99% level. 
Variables being standardized through the principal component analysis, coefficients relating 
to gPCIND have the same unit of measurement simplifying the interpretation of relative 
impacts. Two or three gPCIND are considered in the regression results, according to whether 
the role of institutions is considered or not. The expected positive signs are found for the 
severity of the constraints underlying the institutional factors and the external economic 
environment, highest constraints increasing firms’ inefficiency. On the contrary, a negative 
sign is obtained for the gPCIND reflecting the positive correlation between the quality of in-
house managerial environment and efficiency. The magnitude of the coefficients suggests that 
in-house organizational impact is the most influential, followed by the role of institutions. The 
economic environment, mainly composed of appreciations based on infrastructure and 
financial services, is much less relevant.    
 Figure 2 and Table 4, which are both established from model 4 of Table 3, show that the 
South African (ZAF) textile manufacturing sector is the most technically efficient one within 
the sample with a low standard deviation, suggesting homogeneity of efficiency over a small 
number of firms which are larger than those of the other countries (Table 1). In Brazil as well 
as in Ecuador, enterprises are also quite efficient with an average productivity gap of about 
10% with respect to South Africa. Morocco ranks fourth with a gap of less than 20%.  It is 
worth noticing that Asian countries, i.e. India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka, are significantly below 
the best practice. These three countries account for 57% of the number of firms underlying 
this empirical work. Textile manufacturing in Pakistan is by far the least productive of the 
eight countries with an average firms’ productivity level two times less than in ZAF.  
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Table 4    
Summary statistics about technical efficiencies (model 4) 
 
 
 
N.B: efficiencies resulting from model 4, Table 3. The percentage of coefficient of variation is 
obtained by considering at the country level both the standard deviation and the mean. Technical 
efficiencies are potentially distributed from zero (fully inefficient) to one (the best practice). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
        Country Mean Median 
Standard 
deviation 
Coefficient 
of variation 
Number of 
firms 
Brazil (BRA) 0.705 0.730 0.116 16.56 90 
Ecuador(ECU) 0.688 0.675 0.077 11.23 11 
Egypt (EGY) 0.571 0.561 0.152 26.59 88 
India (IND) 0.576 0.574 0.156 27.18 155 
Sri Lanka (LKA) 0.472 0.447 0.152 32.30 55 
Morocco (MAR) 0.640 0.659 0.130 20.28 144 
Pakistan (PAK) 0.396 0.353 0.152 38.32 262 
South Africa (ZAF) 0.786 0.796 0.045 5.77 16 
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         Figure 2 - International distributions of efficiency measures 
    (Two g-categories considered simultaneously) 
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If we look at what happens when the quality of institutions is taken into account, when we 
introduce the hypothesis that productive performance is conditional upon the way the rules 
are defined and enforced, empirical results are significantly modified (see Table 5 and Figure 
3). In other words, the incorporation of the Doing business information suggests that 
productive efficiency of some countries is strongly affected by extensive regulations and 
weaknesses of public administrations. Although Ecuador is now first before South Africa and 
Brazil, the ranking as well as the statistical distributions of efficiencies do not change a lot 
among the most successful countries. The story is very different when focusing on the least 
efficient sectors, those where the coefficients of variation are the highest. It is clear that textile 
in India, Pakistan and above all in Egypt potentially suffer a lot from the dysfunctioning of 
institutions.   
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Table 5 
Summary statistics about technical efficiencies (model 6) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
N.B: efficiencies resulting from model 6, Table 3. The percentage of coefficient of 
variation is obtained by considering at the country level both the standard deviation and 
the mean. Technical efficiencies are potentially distributed from zero (fully inefficient) to 
one  (the best practice). 
 
 
 
      
Country Mean Median 
Standard 
deviation 
Coefficient 
of variation 
Number 
of firms 
Brazil (BRA) 0.605 0.621 0.130 21.56 90 
Ecuador(ECU) 0.741 0.737 0.052 7.02 11 
Egypt (EGY) 0.110 0.085 0.084 76.68 88 
India (IND) 0.277 0.233 0.157 56.75 155 
Sri Lanka (LKA) 0.467 0.423 0.161 34.49 55 
Morocco (MAR) 0.512 0.534 0.141 27.54 144 
Pakistan (PAK) 0.295 0.251 0.149 50.50 262 
South Africa (ZAF) 0.722 0.737 0.061 8.56 16 
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Figure 3 - International distributions of efficiency measures  
               (three g-categories considered simultaneously) 
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 One question that deserves particular attention for both the robustness of our analysis and 
the relevance of the relative productivity simulations carried out in subsection 4.2 is to 
ascertain whether the results are sensitive or not for a specific year. In respect of production 
technology, ICA databases contain the data for the year surveyed and one or two previous 
years. Unfortunately, this is not the case for the inefficiency determinants as respondents only 
characterize the current year. Therefore, although some countries were surveyed twice, the 
“one step” frontier model cannot be estimated under the conventional time-series-cross-
sectional panel data form. In a cross sectional analysis, strong assumptions underlie the 
breakdown of the composed error model in its U and V terms. The stability of efficiency 
distribution as determined by the application of the standard Aigner et al (1977)’s 
specification (e.g., the stochastic frontier model without the z-factors), was tested for two 
subsequent years.  
 
Graph 1 - Kernel distribution of technical efficiency for two subsequent years:  
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Efficiency measures being estimated rather than observed, the non-parametric kernel 
estimates of efficiency density were used on the sample of 899 firms. Kernel distribution 
reported in graph 1 shows that the two distributions overlap. More formally, the Li (1996) 
statistics13 (0.009176), with p-values of 0.496 does not reject the equality of the two empirical 
distributions.  
 
                                                 
13
 This statistics follows a standard normal variable 
CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2009.23 
 28
B. Simulating efficiencies if firms evolve with the best productive environnement 
Technical efficiency is predicted by placing all firms in the 5% most favorable environment 
we observe in the sample to obtain adjusted efficiency measures (see section III). Simulations 
are successively carried out with respect to the domestic and the international environment. 
For these simulations, model 6 of Table 3 has been retained. In each case, the three g-
categories of efficiency determinants are considered separately. In other words, the firms’ 
environment benchmark is liable to vary from one g-category to another. Although the 
international scenario is likely to be speculative (e.g. public institutions and their effectiveness 
only modify slowly), these simulations demonstrate where producers and governments need 
to promote efforts in order to improve firms’ productivity levels14. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
14
 The same exercise was carried out with no significant variation with the translog specification. Results can be 
provided upon request. 
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Figure 4 - Productive efficiencies within the best domestic environment
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In the domestic framework, total productive efficiency gains range from less than 10% in 
South Africa to about 70% in Egypt (Figure 4). These marked differences reflect statistical 
dispersion, which tends to be more pronounced in the lowest per capita GDP countries. If we 
look at the decomposition of these gains, the in-house organizational source is systematically 
the most important one. For Moroccan firms, this environment accounts for about 90% of the 
23% average expected productivity gains. For the eight countries, the relative contribution of 
this g-category exceeds 70% of the total cumulated productivity improvement. The economic 
environment ranks second, except for Morocco where it is outperformed by the role of 
institutions. Within this empirical frame, we don’t find that modifying institutions would 
enhance a noticeable impact. When moving from the existing to the best domestic 
institutional environment, productive efficiency does not improve more than 10%. There is of 
course a logical dimension in this result. Doing Business information only gives a nationwide 
picture of the institutional environment. The international perspective has the advantage of 
increasing the variance of all variables including institutions. 
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Figure 5 - Productive efficiencies within the best international environment  
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Adjusting efficiencies to the best favorable international conditions changes the story 
(Figure 5). Institutions rank first for three countries with adjusted predictions enhancing 
strong efficiency gains. For Egypt, the productivity level is multiplied by nearly 4 and the 
quality of institutions accounts for about 50% of this improvement. Although simulations for 
India are less spectacular, the average productivity level would more than double. For this 
country, the relative contribution of institutions represents more than half the total of 
cumulative gains.  In Egypt and India, the quality of institutions then overrides everything 
else. This is not the case for Pakistan, Sri-Lanka and Morocco, where the most prominent 
factors are those proceeding from the organizational factors. Once again, the role of the 
economic environment proves negligible except for Sri-Lanka. Finally, and in accordance 
with the “best practice” principle, simulations are of limited interest for South Africa, Brazil 
and Ecuador, where firms effectively benefit the most favorable environment. 
 
                                                  
IV. Conclusion 
 
Productive performance and its determinants have been studied for textile manufacturing by 
considering the “one step” stochastic frontier method. In the eight developing countries 
studied average firms’ efficiency broadly reflects international per capita GDP differences. 
South Africa, Brazil, and to some extent Ecuador, define the “best practice”. On the contrary, 
Egypt, India and Pakistan are poor productive performers with a high dispersion of efficiency 
across firms. The variance of firms’ inefficiency depends on some factors connected with in-
house organization, but also on external components such as the economic and institutional 
environment.  
We find that the most influential inefficiency determinants are connected with access to an 
overdraft facility, but also with some infrastructural services such as  power supply and  
access to modern technology or the Internet that affect the quality of knowledge about market 
conditions. Among the organizational variables, the experience of the top manager proves 
significant in accordance with a “learning by doing” effect. Competition also matters through 
the stimulating impact of the agglomeration effect. As inefficiency determinants are 
correlated, principal component analyses have been used to aggregate information through 
several indices encapsulating three broad categories of factors: managerial know-how (e.g. in-
house organizational efficiency), external economic environment, and institutions.  
Empirical results have shown that firm’s productivity level is significantly influenced by 
these three broad categories of factors. Both managerial know-how and the institutional 
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environment are by far the most influential components.  These results have been extended by 
simulations where we predict the productivity gains that could be obtained if firms had the 
opportunity of evolving in a more favorable environment. At the domestic level, nation-based 
simulations suggest that in-house organizational determinants prevail. For the eight country- 
sector based studied, the relative contribution of this component exceeds 70% of the total 
cumulated productivity gains. Simulations in the international environment display much 
more important productivity gains. In this framework, institutions prevail for three countries 
(Egypt, India, Ecuador). In Egypt, firm productivity level would be multiplied by nearly 4, the 
quality of institutions accounting for about 50% of this improvement. The role of the external 
environment including “hard infrastructure” is much less important. Productive performance 
may thus be increased by stimulating managerial efficiency and the driving mission of the 
State in the definition and application of efficient rules. 
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Appendix 1 - Probit results for the sample selection bias  
(Inverse Mills Ratio) 
 
 Model for the frontier 
with the individual  
z-determinants 
Model for the frontier 
with the PCIND indices  
as z-determinants 
Firm Size (permanent 
employment) 
-0.053 -0.199 
 
(0.082) (0.089)** 
Legal status of the firm -0.686 -0.337 
 
(0.321)** (0.215) 
Individual firm -0.570 -0.148 
 
(0.204)*** (0.283) 
Family firm  -0.361 -0.352 
 
(0.170)** (0.195)* 
Constant 2.013 2.703 
 
(0.399)*** (0.365)*** 
Observations 899 899 
% of correct prediction 69.30 77.09 
 
 
N.B. The two models refer to the same sample of observations but differ by the endogeneous 
dichotomous variable. The construction of the PCINDs requires more information about a 
larger number of variables. Therefore the percentage of non respondent firms is different. 
Standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 
1%. The regressions include countries dummies. 
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Appendix 2 - Regressions for instrumentation of endogenous variables 
 
 Overdraft facility Access to the 
financial 
Constraint 
Access 
to 
internet 
Size -0.014 0.025 -0.020 
 
(0.018) (0.060) (0.015) 
Foreign ownership (% of capital) -0.001 -0.001 0.000 
 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
Export (% of sales) 0.001 -0.001 0.001 
 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000)*
* 
Overdraft facilities++ 0.978 0.025 0.002 
 
(0.044)*** (0.133) (0.041) 
Electricity constraint++ 0.006 0.004 0.003 
 
(0.014) (0.041) (0.011) 
Education (% of workforce) 0.005 -0.002 0.002 
 
(0.001)*** (0.003) (0.001)*
* 
Access to financial constraint++ -0.002 1.012 0.008 
 
(0.012) (0.040)*** (0.013) 
Access to internet++ -0.002 -0.002 0.991 
 
(0.045) (0.114) (0.037)*
** 
Experience of top manager 0.001 -0.005 -0.001 
 
(0.001) (0.004) (0.001) 
Agglomeration -0.002 0.007 0.001 
 
(0.014) (0.039) (0.012) 
Corruption constraint++ -0.003 -0.003 -0.001 
 
(0.013) (0.044) (0.011) 
Constant 0.214 0.727 -0.048 
 
(0.227) (0.534) (0.149) 
Observations 1031 1001 1023 
R-squared 0.55 0.48 0.49 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Regressions include 
country dummies 
PS:  ++ regional mean by firm size. 
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Appendix 3 -  Principal Components Analyses 
 
Eigenvectors 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
    _1++ 0,22 0,04 -0,12 -0,47 0,09 0,71 0,31 0,01 0,26 0,06 -0,13 0,08 -0,10 0,04 
_2 0,39 0,06 0,03 0,03 -0,08 0,05 0,08 -0,28 -0,55 -0,11 -0,38 -0,43 -0,01 0,26 
_3 0,06 0,44 0,29 -0,05 -0,04 0,05 -0,14 -0,51 -0,07 -0,31 0,15 0,54 -0,08 0,07 
_4 0,21 0,39 0,07 0,23 -0,10 -0,15 -0,09 0,20 0,31 0,22 -0,49 0,04 -0,35 0,19 
_5 -0,02 0,44 0,25 -0,08 -0,04 -0,23 0,46 0,33 0,18 -0,16 0,03 -0,08 0,41 0,12 
_6 0,34 -0,06 0,34 -0,30 -0,17 0,00 -0,20 0,08 0,00 -0,07 0,19 -0,23 0,37 -0,04 
_7 0,32 -0,20 0,25 0,09 -0,04 -0,15 -0,01 -0,41 0,57 0,13 0,16 -0,28 -0,14 -0,14 
_8 0,34 -0,21 0,26 0,11 0,10 -0,05 0,12 0,09 -0,21 0,36 -0,28 0,48 0,25 -0,41 
_9 0,10 -0,09 0,23 0,16 0,88 0,05 -0,11 0,11 0,04 -0,20 0,01 -0,05 0,00 0,24 
_10 0,26 0,19 -0,46 -0,17 0,08 -0,06 -0,61 0,06 0,14 0,09 -0,05 0,08 0,36 0,08 
_11 0,39 0,00 -0,19 0,02 -0,05 -0,09 0,00 0,33 -0,02 -0,61 0,06 0,02 -0,34 -0,44 
_12 0,36 -0,21 -0,05 -0,03 -0,14 -0,14 0,12 0,23 -0,14 0,19 0,46 0,27 -0,24 0,56 
_13 0,22 0,03 -0,41 0,59 -0,02 0,16 0,31 -0,21 0,13 -0,11 0,14 0,06 0,37 0,05 
_14 0,04 0,41 0,17 0,32 -0,01 0,43 -0,18 0,21 -0,20 0,31 0,40 -0,23 -0,11 -0,23 
        __15 0,10 0,33 -0,29 -0,30 0,36 -0,39 0,28 -0,23 -0,16 0,31 0,20 -0,12 -0,14 -0,24 
  
 N.B: ++ Regional average by firm size: Starting a business: (1) Corruption constraint: number of procedures,  (2) cost (% of income 
per cap), (3) min capital (% of income per cap); Hiring and Firing worker: (4) difficulty of firing index,  (5) cost of firing (weeks of 
salaries); Registering property: (6) time (days), (7) cost of property value;  Trading across borders: (8) time for import, (9) cost to 
import, (us dollar per container);  Enforcing contracts: (10) number of procedures, (11) time (days) and  (12) costs (% of income per 
capita); Closing a business: (13) time (years); Dealing with licenses:  (14) number of procedures and (15) cost (% of income per 
capita) 
 
PCA 
Components Eigenvalues Proportions Cumulative 
1 5,65 0,38 0,38 
2 3,71 0,25 0,62 
3 1,29 0,09 0,71 
4 1,15 0,08 0,79 
5 1,03 0,07 0,86 
6 0,75 0,05 0,91 
7 0,42 0,03 0,93 
8 0,33 0,02 0,96 
9 0,24 0,02 0,97 
10 0,15 0,01 0,98 
11 0,08 0,01 0,99 
12 0,07 0,00 0,99 
13 0,07 0,00 1,00 
14 0,03 0,00 1,00 
15 0,01 0,00 1,00 
 
Principal Component Index (PCINDg): Managerial know-how and in-house organization  
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Eigenvectors        
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1- Formal training 0,44 0,09 -0,03 -0,45 0,25 0,20 0,61 0,34 
2- Education (% of workforce) 0,34 -0,14 0,54 0,40 -0,10 -0,44 0,41 -0,22 
3- Access to internet+ 0,49 0,15 -0,09 -0,35 -0,08 0,07 -0,22 -0,74 
4- Education of top manager 0,26 -0,60 0,16 0,23 0,50 0,43 -0,27 -0,01 
5- Experience of top manager 0,05 0,75 0,37 0,31 0,24 0,36 -0,12 0,03 
6- Foreign ownership (% of capital) 0,22 0,18 -0,62 0,37 0,48 -0,41 0,00 -0,01 
7- Export (% of sales) 0,29 -0,03 -0,37 0,46 -0,57 0,46 0,17 0,06 
8- Overdraft facilities+ 0,50 0,05 0,13 -0,09 -0,24 -0,28 -0,55 0,54 
+ predicted variables (Regressions in Appendix 2) 
 
PCA 
Components Eigenvalues Proportions Cumulative 
1 2,23 0,28 0,28 
2 1,07 0,13 0,41 
3 1,02 0,13 0,54 
4 1,00 0,12 0,66 
5 0,88 0,11 0,77 
6 0,76 0,10 0,87 
7 0,55 0,07 0,94 
8 0,49 0,06 1,00 
 
Principal Component Index (PCINDg): External economic environment   
 
Eigenvectors     
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 
1- Agglomeration 0,13 0,69 0,70 0,05 0,10 
2- Electricity constraint++ 0,56 0,20 -0,20 0,10 -0,77 
3- Telecom constraint++ 0,56 0,06 -0,28 0,53 0,57 
4- Transport constraint++ 0,55 -0,15 0,07 -0,78 0,24 
5- Access to financial constraint+ 0,23 -0,67 0,62 0,31 -0,13 
++ Regional mean averages by firm size; + predicted variables (see Appendix 2) 
                 
PCA 
Components Eigenvalue Proportion Cumulative 
1 1,98 0,40 0,40 
2 1,11 0,22 0,62 
3 0,87 0,17 0,79 
4 0,55 0,11 0,90 
5 0,48 0,10 1,00 
 
 
 
Appendix 4 - Heckman’s sample selectivity correction 
CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2009.23 
 38
 
 
In a first regression a Probit model is estimated as follows:  
iii Wh ωθ +=            (7) 
ih  is a dummy variable which takes the value 1 when the firm gives the full information on 
all the variables needed for the “one step” method, and 0 if we only have partial information. 
iW  is the vector of firm characteristics, with some of them underlying the attrition of the 
initial sample and θ the parameters to be estimated while iω  is the usual random error term. 
The variables retained and the estimation results are reported in Appendix 1. The 
measurement of Heckman’s selection bias is obtained after the estimation of the Probit model 
according to: )(
)(
θ
θφρ
i
i
i W
W
Φ
=   (8), where  (.) and (.) Φφ refer to the normal probability and the 
normal cumulative distribution, respectively. The factor correction is the inverse Mills ratio 
denoted iρ . As we don’t know where the potential bias arises, this factor has been potentially 
introduced in the production technology (1) and/or in the inefficiency determinants (2). 
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